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sciousness, according to a fundamental law of its nature, remains insensible; it only perceives the variable and accidental properties which express the nature of the stimulus. The result is thus equivalent to a transformation; it is not, however, the transformation of a physical into a mental phenomenon, and properly speaking there is no transformation, but only analysis.

The fundamental error in this whole argumentation, in the writer's opinion, is the utterly uncritical identification of sensation, sensory content, perceived qualities and material object. If sensations are material phenomena, then no doubt images, ideas and conceptions are material phenomena too, and the author is quite right in his paradoxical contention that psychology is a science of matter. But the very paradox of this conclusion makes one suspicious of the premises. Mind, on M. Binet's assumptions, seems to me to be left without form or content and the material world to be void of any principle of permanence or continuity. That sensations can exist without consciousness is a pure assertion. Granting, even, that 'sensation' is to be taken as meaning 'perceived quality,' are we really to suppose that the multitudinous shapes and sizes of things, which vary with every change in the conditions of their perception, continue unchanged as material properties independent of these conditions? If not all, why some, or any? Subjective idealism, absurd as it may be, is surely a saner and more natural conclusion than this bizarre realism. I cannot but think that a more thorough analysis of what we mean by objective experience, or the reference of objects to consciousness in general, would have led to the discovery of factors undreamed of in M. Binet's philosophy. But to this meaning his abstractedly objective conception of the categories has fatally blocked the way. But as he has not adequately analyzed experience, so he has not given, as it seems to me, either a satisfactory definition of matter or a satisfactory definition of mind, and consequently he has not solved or even properly stated the problem. Incidentally the contradictions in his thought appear, as when, speaking of the catagories, he denies that the mind creates relations and declares intelligence to be but an inactive consciousness (p. 121); yet he constantly speaks of 'acts' of consciousness and explicitly affirms of reasoning that it is an activity which creates relations (p. 176). Still more striking is the confusion when in the very same context he states, first, that all our knowledge of the properties of matter is by (*par*) sensation (p. 65) and then (p. 66) that all we know of matter is not known in or by (*par*) sensation, but is the sensation itself.

Smith College.

H. N. GARDINER.

*Paedagogische Psychologie*, von L. HABRICH. Kempten, 1903. pp. lxxii, 660.

This work—issued in 1903, but only recently received by the *Journal*—is an applied psychology written for use in Roman Catholic schools: it contains "die wichtigsten Kapitel der Seelenlehre, unter durchgängiger Anwendung auf Unterricht und Erziehung vom Standpunkte christlicher Philosophie anschaulich dargestellt." Of its two parts, Pt. i, *Das Erkenntnisvermögen*, had reached its second edition with a sale of 8,000 copies within a year from the date of publication; a sufficient evidence of the suitability of the book to the purpose for which it was intended. Pt. ii, *Das Strebevermögen*, appears here in its first edition.

The plan of the work is that of a psychology in duplicate; the theoretical sections are followed, under each heading, by sections on application. The present reviewer cannot approve this plan, but agrees rather with the "oberste Schulbehörde in Preussen" that

theory should come first, as a whole, and application be made later in a separate course. However, this is a matter of opinion only, and the author writes from ripe pedagogical experience. The work itself is a highly articulated system, couched in the spirit and largely in the language of Aristotelian scholasticism, and leaning heavily on the larger books of Pesch and Willmann. So far as its psychology goes, it is a product of the desk, and there is no evidence that the writer has thought—still less experimented—in his own person and at first hand. Occasional references are made to the leading works upon scientific psychology; but rather, it would seem, with the view of showing that Catholicism need not fear the new movement than through any sympathy with, or real understanding of, the modern trend. The student will, therefore, gain from the work very little knowledge of the present status of psychology, though he will be mightily reassured as regards the immortality of his soul. "Was gelten mir alle Lehren von der Wahrnehmung," exclaims the author, "der Vorstellung, dem Gedächtnis, oder die neueren Fragen von der Ermüdung; von der physiologischen Zeit, oder die Fragen der Kinderpsychologie: von der Entwicklung des Sehens, des Hörens, des Sprechens, was gelten alle diese Fragen, so anziehend sie sein mögen, neben der Hauptfrage: Habe ich eine unsterbliche Seele? Sie sind ein unbedeutender Kleinkram neben der grossen Hauptsache."

M. W. WISEMAN.

*Anatomie du système nerveux de l'homme: Leçons professées à l'Université de Louvain, par A. VAN GEHUCHTEN.* 4me. edition. Louvain, 1906. pp. xv, 999.

We need do no more than call attention to the appearance of a fourth and revised edition of this excellent treatise. The first edition was published as recently as 1893; and the fact that a fourth edition has become necessary in the course of thirteen years is a sufficient guarantee of the usefulness and authoritative character of the work. As regards the thoroughness of the revision, we may quote a sentence from the new preface. "Nous n'étonnerons certes personne en avouant, en toute sincérité, que ce travail considérable de révision a exigé de notre part un labeur de tous les jours poursuivi pendant près de deux ans." The result is worthy of the author and of the science which he represents.

In 1900, contemporaneously with the publication of a third edition of the present work, the author began the publication of his journal "Le Névraxe." The papers which have appeared in this journal have, of course, been largely drawn upon in the preparation of the new edition. Regard is paid to the new light thrown upon the old questions of the reticulated structure of cellular protoplasm, nervous regeneration, the unicellular or pluricellular origin of the neurone, etc., etc. In the discussion of the paths of nervous conduction, the arrangement of former editions, based on Flechsig's demarcation of the cortex, has been given up. The author now considers, separately, first the ascending paths that carry sensible impressions to the cortex, whatever their nature, and whatever the organ, internal or external, sensory or non-sensory, destined to receive them; and secondly the descending paths, cortical or sub-cortical, mesencephalic, pontal, medullary or spinal, by means of which the nervous system is enabled to respond, consciously or unconsciously, to the stimuli which play upon it. This mode of treatment renders it possible to consider the long and the short paths by themselves, and to bring the reflex paths into a natural connection with the latter.

In view of the recent controversies regarding the neurone theory, the author's conclusion may be interesting. He writes as follows